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A CONSTITUTIONAL TANGO OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION: THE INSTABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY
COURT AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE III
ABSTRACT
Despite historical and modern developments, the heart of bankruptcy law
centers around providing fresh starts to those who find themselves in severe
financial distress. Congress created bankruptcy courts to help efficiently and
effectively facilitate this goal. However, the complexity of debtor-creditor
relationships necessitates that most bankruptcy proceedings hear a variety of
claims, some of which may not arise out of the bankruptcy itself but are still
required for bankruptcy resolution. Consequently, the authority of bankruptcy
courts to hear all relevant claims is an essential component of bankruptcy relief.
Article III of the United States Constitution states that judicial authority is
vested in judges with life tenure and protected salaries. Based on opposing
interpretations, a bankruptcy court may or may not be authorized to hear certain
ancillary common law claims in a proceeding. A strict construction of Article III
suggests that bankruptcy courts lack the necessary safeguards to exercise
judicial authority. In contrast, a broad construction of Article III suggests that
bankruptcy courts may exercise limited judicial authority in light of the practical
benefits and minimal dangers. These two opposing canons of construction have
shaped a volatile history of bankruptcy law.
This Comment explores the dynamic relationship between non-Article III
bankruptcy courts and Article III judicial authority, and how this unstable
relationship affects the facilitation of bankruptcy goals. This Comment suggests
a balanced four-factor approach to when the Court inevitably redraws the
constitutional lines of bankruptcy court authority. Lending sufficient weight to
each factor will increase the likelihood that bankruptcy procedures properly
adapt to rapid societal growth within a constitutional framework, while
providing more predictability in bankruptcy law development.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial struggle has been prevalent throughout history, and it has almost
become a normal phase of life in today’s market.1 The real danger arises when
those who find themselves in poor economic situations cannot prevent their
struggles from escalating into severe financial distress.2 Anticipating this
ubiquitous problem centuries ago, the Framers of the United States Constitution
decided it was necessary “to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States.”3 As such, Congress was
constitutionally authorized to create federal bankruptcy laws providing debtors
with the opportunity to “start afresh.”4 The United States Supreme Court
illustrated that the goal of bankruptcy was to “give to the honest but unfortunate
debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future efforts,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”5 To
promote these ends, Congress ultimately created bankruptcy courts to support
the federal district courts in efficiently adjudicating bankruptcy claims.6
Due to the complex nature of debtor-creditor relationships, the efficient
facilitation of bankruptcy proceedings rests considerably on a bankruptcy
court’s authority to hear a comprehensive range of claims.7 This broad authority
is essential because bankruptcy proceedings seldom consist solely of one
bankruptcy issue.8 Rather, these proceedings often include numerous claims that
do not arise from the bankruptcy itself, but are still vital to the resolution of
bankruptcy disputes.9 For example, a claim over an alleged breach of contracts
is governed by state law, but must be resolved to determine the appropriate sum
of valid claims against a debtor.10 Congress recognized and addressed this
necessity through the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which empowered bankruptcy
courts with the statutory authority to render final judgments on claims that were
not primary bankruptcy issues.11

1
See United States Bankruptcies, TRADINGECONOMICS.COM, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
united-states/bankruptcies (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
2
See id.
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
5
Id.
6
28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984).
7
1 Collier on Bankruptcy 3.02[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
8
See Bankruptcy Servs. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 454 (2d Cir. 2008).
9
See id.
10
See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
11
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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While bankruptcy courts had clear statutory authority, questions regarding
whether bankruptcy courts had the necessary constitutional authority developed
over time.12 The central constitutional concern was that a bankruptcy court’s
ability to hear ancillary, non-bankruptcy claims challenged the structural
separation of powers.13 The United States Constitution creates a government
framework that ensures a system of checks and balances—a structure intended
to prevent a concentration of power by dividing the government into three
distinct branches with separate and independent authority.14 Though the intent
was to avoid conflicts, the separation of powers generated frequent and fierce
arguments regarding the corresponding boundaries of legislative and judicial
authority.15
Bankruptcy court authority is one of the many casualties of this ongoing
separation of powers debate, “a constitutionally required game of jurisdictional
ping-pong between courts . . . .”16 Over the last century, Supreme Court
precedent has largely fluctuated between two opposing interpretations of a
bankruptcy judge’s authority to render final decisions in cases and controversies
not arising from the bankruptcy itself.17
On one side, a strict construction18 of the Constitution suggests that it is
unconstitutional for Congress to confer judicial authority on non-Article III
bankruptcy judges because they do not comply with the structural safeguards of
Article III.19 On the other side, a broad construction20 suggests that it is
constitutional for Congress to confer judicial authority because, in light of the
complex realities of bankruptcy law, the practical benefits considerably

12

N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 57.
Id.
14
Separation of Powers – An Overview, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
15
See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 57.
16
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 520–21 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17
Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932
(2015).
18
The term strict construction, or narrow construction, is defined as “interpreting the Constitution based
on a literal and narrow definition of the language without reference to the differences in conditions when the
Constitution was written and modern conditions, inventions and societal changes.” Strict Construction,
LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2028 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
19
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 503.
20
Broad construction, in contrast to strict construction, “looks to what someone thinks was the ‘intent’
of the framers’ language and expands and interprets the language extensively to meet current standards of human
conduct and complexity of society.” Strict Construction, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.
aspx?selected=2028 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
13

KIM_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

564

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

6/14/2018 3:43 PM

[Vol. 34

outweigh the minimal dangers.21 Today, the exact scope of bankruptcy court
authority still remains an important point of contention.22
The lack of clarity in the scope of bankruptcy court authority creates residual
uncertainty for bankruptcy procedures.23 This ambiguity is a significant problem
because the fundamental purpose of bankruptcy proceedings is the quick and
efficient facilitation of debtor relief and creditor repayment.24 Focus on
promptness and efficiency is increasingly diverted to ancillary jurisdictional
arguments, which instead lead to “inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and
needless additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”25
In response to this developing concern, the United States Supreme Court
provided some procedural clarity in 2015 through Wellness International
Network Limited v. Sharif, which held that bankruptcy courts had the authority
to render final judgments on related non-bankruptcy claims with the consent of
the parties to the case.26 The Wellness dissent, however, characterizes the
Court’s decision as an “impermissible [threat to] the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch,”27 cautioning that an “individual may not consent away the
institutional interest protected by the separation of powers.”28 Thus, the
constitutional boundaries of bankruptcy court authority remain blurred.
If history is any indication of the future, the outlook of bankruptcy court
authority will be subject to perpetual fluctuation.29 It was only a few years ago
when bankruptcy court authority was thoroughly limited by strict, formalistic
interpretation.30 Subsequent narrow holdings have sidestepped certain
procedural hurdles in bankruptcy proceedings, but the most important
constitutional question regarding the scope of bankruptcy court authority still
remains largely unanswered, or at least full of ambiguity. When dealing with a
time-sensitive issue such as bankruptcy, procedural efficiency is paramount to
those who are in financial distress and eagerly awaiting resolution.
This Comment explores the dynamic relationship between non-Article III
bankruptcy courts and Article III judicial authority, and how this unstable
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932.
See id. at 1954.
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462.
Id. at 520–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932.
Id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932.
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462.
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relationship affects the facilitation of bankruptcy law. First, this Comment
examines the historical development of bankruptcy law and how the United
States Supreme Court has shaped bankruptcy precedent through its shifting
interpretations of Article III. Next, this Comment addresses the developing
concerns resulting from both the strict and broad construction of Article III
authority as it relates to bankruptcy courts. Finally, this Comment suggests that
when the Court, again, inevitably addresses the constitutional concerns of
bankruptcy court authority, the Court should lend sufficient weight to the
following four factors: (1) the current threat of encroachment, and the amount
of protection necessary to prevent it; (2) the practical effects on bankruptcy
proceedings, and the benefits of preserving bankruptcy law; (3) the residual
consequences to existing non-Article III tribunals; and (4) the current trend and
disposition of bankruptcy authority. This balanced four-factor approach can
increase the likelihood that bankruptcy procedures adapt to rapid societal growth
within a constitutional framework, while providing more predictability in
bankruptcy law development.
I.

BACKGROUND

From colonial state law debtor-creditor proceedings, to federal bankruptcy
laws, to recent amendments of the Federal Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, the
only consistency in the scope of bankruptcy authority has been its inconsistency.
Examining the evolution of debtor-creditor relations throughout the history of
the United States provides a basic foundation for understanding how strict and
broad construction have shaped bankruptcy law.
A. The Establishment of Federal Bankruptcy Laws: Finding the Proper
Balance between Debtors, Creditors, and Courts
Until almost the twentieth century, there was no reliable federal regulation
of bankruptcy.31 Before federal laws, the states were independently responsible
for adjudicating bankruptcy claims but often suffered from problematic
jurisdictional restrictions.32 Instead of relief, imprisonment was a common state
remedy.33 Consequently, state law bankruptcy proceedings were tainted with
volatility and regularly left debtors dwelling, or literally imprisoned, in financial
turmoil.34 In 1787, the Framers of the Constitution believed that federal
31

DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 23 (2001).
Id.
33
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 5, 12 (1995).
34
SKEEL, supra note 31, at 23–24.
32
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legislation of bankruptcy laws was necessary to address the “problems that
varying and discriminatory state laws caused for nonresident creditors and
interstate commerce in general.”35 Through the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress
was empowered to “pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies.”36
In response to repeated financial crises and commercial failures,37 Congress
attempted to pass a set of federal bankruptcy laws in 1800.38 The Bankruptcy
Act of 1800 was a system established for merchants which only provided for
petitions from creditors.39 Based on early English custom, the federal
bankruptcy laws had a “distinctly pro-creditor orientation, and was noteworthy
for its harsh treatment of defaulting debtors.”40 Because the laws essentially
functioned as a commercial “creditors’ remedy,” private individuals, such as
those in agriculture, were outraged.41 Predictably, the 1800 Act was short-lived
and eventually repealed in 1803, due to its ineffectiveness and disapproval
among the general population.42
It took almost forty years for Congress to implement another federal
bankruptcy system through the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.43 Under the 1841 Act,
voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, which were previously limited to merchants,
became an available option for all financially troubled debtors.44 This marked
the first time that an insolvent debtor had the option to file for bankruptcy and
receive a discharge.45 A debtor was permitted to bring “all cases and
controversies in bankruptcy arising between the bankrupt and any creditor” to
the district courts for adjudication.46 However, this new set of federal bankruptcy
laws, viewed as somewhat overly sympathetic to debtors, caused a rapid influx
of bankruptcy filings to the district court dockets.47 Following criticism from

35

Tabb, supra note 33, at 13.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
37
The Panic of 1792 and Panic of 1797 caused widespread ruin and financial turmoil. See generally
Robert Sylla, et. al., Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis Management During the U.S. Financial Crisis
of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61. (2009); Richard S. Chu, Certain Victims of an International Contagion: The
Panic of 1797 and the Hard Times of the Late 1790s in Baltimore, 25 J. EARLY REP., 565 (2005).
38
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_bankruptcy.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
39
Id.
40
Tabb, supra note 33, at 7.
41
Id. at 14–15.
42
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Tabb, supra note 33, at 17.
46
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
47
Id.
36
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creditors and overburdened district courts, the 1841 Act was also ultimately
repealed.48
Having experienced the benefits of a discharge, there was overwhelming
support for a system of federal bankruptcy laws because state laws could not
discharge preexisting debts.49 Congress responded in 1867 and passed a revised
set of bankruptcy laws in which ordinary suits in law and equity related to the
bankruptcy fell into an expanded jurisdiction for district and circuit courts.50
With the 1867 Act, the federal courts were able to hear “plenary suits” involving
the bankruptcy and any third parties with ancillary property disputes, even
without a basis for federal court jurisdiction.51 The United States Supreme Court
held this grant of jurisdiction to be constitutional because it was considered to
be a “legitimate part of a national system of bankruptcy.”52 District judges also
appointed several “registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge of the district court
in the performance of his duties.”53 Still, due to the excessive costs and lengthy
delays of bankruptcy proceedings, the 1867 Act was eventually repealed in
1874, proving yet again that the one constant in bankruptcy law was change.54
Though there were several endeavors to institute a permanent and reliable
system, most of the nineteenth century was characterized by unsuccessful
attempts at finding the proper balance between debtors, creditors, and
bankruptcy adjudicators.55 The 1800 Act limited bankruptcy relief to creditors
in the commercial realm, and neglected a significant portion of private debtors
in need of financial assistance.56 The 1841 Act opened up voluntary proceedings
to all insolvent debtors and discharged thousands of individual debts, but it
outraged creditors and burdened district courts with overwhelming bankruptcy
dockets.57 The 1867 Act gave district courts original jurisdiction over
bankruptcy and provided registers to lighten the docket, but high costs and
delays ultimately proved fatal to effective proceedings.58 Congress could not
find an equitable balance between debtors and creditors or an efficient means to
resolve their bankruptcy disputes.

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Tabb, supra note 33, at 19.
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
Id.
Id.
Tabb, supra note 33, at 19.
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
Id.
See generally Tabb, supra note 33.
Id.
Id. at 19.
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Efforts to address the instabilities and inefficiencies of state bankruptcy law
eventually resulted in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which established the modern
concepts of debtor-creditor relations.59 The 1898 Act finally instituted federal
bankruptcy law as a permanent regulatory system, rather than a temporary
remedy for crisis.60 Not only did this system address debtor relief and equitable
creditor distribution, but it focused on efficient facilitation and procedure.61
Federal district courts were now empowered to sit as “courts of bankruptcy,”
and appoint “referees” to conduct most of the bankruptcy proceedings.62 These
referees handled “the bulk of the judicial and administrative work” and
“exercised much of the jurisdiction given to the district courts.”63
However, because state law concurrently governed many bankruptcy-related
issues, the scope of federal court jurisdiction over bankruptcy became a source
of controversy.64 Federal courts maintained jurisdiction of summary bankruptcy
proceedings, but ordinary disputes of law and equity relating to the bankruptcy
estates were predominantly left to state courts for adjudication.65 This resulted
in immense confusion as to which cases were designated as summary
proceedings and which cases required full and formal adjudication in state
courts.66 Ambiguous jurisdictional problems subsequently led to increased
litigation of jurisdictional questions rather than efficient adjudication of
bankruptcy proceedings.67 Meanwhile, bankruptcy filings continued to
increase.68
In response to the obscurity in bankruptcy jurisdiction, combined with rising
numbers of bankruptcy filings over the years, Congress initiated a complete
reform of bankruptcy laws.69 The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 established Title 11
of the United States Code, commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code (the
Code).70 The Code ameliorated the “splintered jurisdictional scheme” of the
1898 Act by substantially expanding bankruptcy court jurisdiction.71
Specifically, this statute empowered bankruptcy courts to hear and decide all
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
Tabb, supra note 33, at 23–24.
Id, at 25.
Id.
Id.
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
Id.
Tabb, supra note 33, at 34.
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civil proceedings “arising under” or “related to” Title 11.72 In the new system,
the bankruptcy courts functioned as units under the applicable United States
district courts, and each district court had the option to refer bankruptcy matters
to the bankruptcy court.73
The main objective of this extensive reform was to create a single tribunal
to hear all bankruptcy related legal disputes and eliminate jurisdictional
uncertainty between federal, state, and bankruptcy courts.74 While it took almost
two centuries, the Code seemed to finally provide a “unified jurisdictional
system” of bankruptcy that struck a proper balance between debtor relief,
creditor repayment, and efficient adjudication.75 Instead, the Code became a
source of constitutional controversy and increased uncertainty. Two centuries of
modifications and adjustments culminated into a battleground for opposing
approaches to constitutional construction and judicial interpretation.
B. Federal Bankruptcy Law Precedent: How the United States Supreme Court
Shaped Bankruptcy Court Authority through Constitutional Construction
Since the establishment of the Code in 1978, Supreme Court precedent has
mostly swayed between two opposing approaches to interpreting Article III of
the Constitution: strict and broad construction.76 Specifically, the Court has had
conflicting approaches to section 1 of Article III, which states:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at
stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.77

A strict construction of constitutional text relies on the “literal and narrow
definition,” without consideration of modern conditions and societal changes.78
Thus, a strict interpretation of Article III suggests that only judges with the

72

28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).
Id. § 157.
74
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
75
Tabb, supra note 33, at 34.
76
Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.
Ct. 1932 (2015).
77
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
78
Strict Construction, supra note 18.
73
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proper safeguards of (1) life tenure and (2) protected salary can exercise Article
III judicial authority.79
In contrast, a broad construction of constitutional text looks to the Framers’
underlying intent, and then expands upon the text to adapt to the current needs
of people in a rapidly changing society.80 Thus, a broad interpretation of Article
III looks to the fundamental purpose of Article III safeguards, and then
determines whether limited Article III authority can be properly exercised in
particular situations that substantially address societal needs, without
realistically threatening the intended protections.81 Starting from the institution
of the Code to the present, Supreme Court precedent reveals that the inherent
conflict between opposing constitutional constructions has inconsistently shaped
bankruptcy law, and remains largely unresolved.
1. Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line
Company: Courts Lacking the Independence and Protection Provided in
Article III Cannot Exercise Article III Judicial Authority
In response to the Code’s expansion of bankruptcy court authority, the
Supreme Court significantly limited bankruptcy court jurisdiction in Northern
Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company. In Northern
Pipeline, a plurality determined that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
unconstitutionally authorized bankruptcy judges to exercise the “judicial power
of the United States” under Article III of the Constitution.82 The plaintiff,
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. (“Northern”), filed a petition for
reorganization under chapter 11 of the Code in a bankruptcy court.83 In 1980,
Northern brought suit in the same court against defendant Marathon Pipeline Co.
(“Marathon”) for alleged breaches of contracts.84 Marathon immediately moved
to dismiss this suit on the grounds that the Code unconstitutionally conferred
Article III judicial authority on non-Article III judges.85
In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan determined that Article III judicial
powers could not be conferred on judges who lacked life tenure and protection
from salary reduction.86 He reasoned that when adjudicating cases, “tenure and
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 503.
Strict Construction, supra note 18.
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 62.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.at 56–57.
Id.at 59.
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protection from diminution” were necessary “safeguards” to secure political
independence from the legislative or executive branches of government.87
However, this decision did not explicitly address the constitutionality of nonArticle III courts exercising Article III judicial authority.88
Rather, the Court distinguished bankruptcy courts from three categories of
exceptions in which non-Article III courts could actually exercise traditional
judicial authority.89 First, territorial courts were exempt because Congress had
the authority to exercise the general powers of the government in territories of
the United States.90 Second, courts-martial, or military courts, were exempt
because the political branches had broad constitutional authority to control the
military.91 Third, cases involving “public rights” were exempt because these
cases involved matters between an individual and the government, as opposed
to private rights involving disputes between two private parties.92
Consequently, the Court determined Congress did not have the power to vest
bankruptcy courts with broad authority to adjudicate state law matters not
governed by federal rules.93 Instead, Congress was only authorized to assign
matters to non-Article III courts in situations involving federal statutes.94 Even
then, non-Article III courts could only wield limited powers narrower than those
of Article III courts.95 Because Northern Pipeline involved contractual rights
subject to state law, the Court concluded that a bankruptcy court’s exercise of
Article III judicial authority encroached upon Article III territory.96
Writing for the dissent, Justice White emphasized that the plurality’s strict
construction of Article III oversimplified the separation of powers analysis.97 He
argued that examining Article III through pure textualism98 was problematic for
two reasons.99 First, the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was not invalid on its face, but
87

Id. at 57.
Id. at 64–71.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 64–66.
91
Id. at 66.
92
Id. at 67.
93
Id. at 71–74.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 71–72.
97
Id. at 93 (White, J. dissenting).
98
Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation used to determine the meaning of legislation.
Textualism focuses on the plain text of a statute and attempts to derive objective meaning of the legal text. See
Textualism, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/textualism. (last visited Apr. 6,
2018).
99
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 94–95 (White, J. dissenting).
88
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only invalid when narrowly applied to the Northern Pipeline case.100 Second,
even though issues of bankruptcy, by nature, almost always involve both federal
and state law issues, state law claims were heard too infrequently to render a
bankruptcy court’s ability to adjudicate such claims as an intrusion on the
separation of powers.101 Justice White’s dissent argued that the Court
disregarded the complex realities of bankruptcy law and its applications to
society, in favor of a rigid theory on the separation of powers.102
The dissent further emphasized that there was no harm to the separation of
powers because bankruptcy judges essentially assumed the role of the “referees”
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.103 In fact, it was noted that under the 1978
Act, there were even greater safeguards in place because district courts were
given broader scope to judicially review any bankruptcy court decisions.104
Rather than assenting to a bright line determination of matters that must appear
before Article III courts, Justice White advocated a broad construction of Article
III through a balancing test.105 The balancing test proposed that legislative
encroachment should be determined by weighing the benefits of legislative
courts against the actual dangers or effects on judicial independence.106
Justice White ultimately asserted that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 passed the
balancing test for three reasons. First, bankruptcy courts were subject to
appellate review by Article III courts.107 Second, there were no attempts from
Congress to seize power from the Judiciary.108 Third, the Congressional goals of
creating bankruptcy courts were worthy objectives.109 However, despite the
dissent’s reasoning, the Northern Pipeline decision led Congress to amend the
Bankruptcy Act in 1984.110 This amendment authorized federal courts to refer
all bankruptcy issues to bankruptcy courts, but limited bankruptcy courts to
submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for any “non-core”
issues to the district courts.111
100

Id.
Id. at 96–100.
102
Id. at 98.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 100.
105
Id. at 113.
106
Id. at 113–15.
107
Id. at 116–18.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 118.
110
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1983).
111
Id. (“A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise
related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge
101
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Despite the plurality holding in Northern Pipeline, the dissent’s proposed
balancing test would prove to be the foundation for future advocates of broad
construction and an impediment to advocates of strict construction.112
2. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor: Administrative
Agencies May Exercise Jurisdiction over State Law Counterclaims in
Certain Situations
After the Northern Pipeline decision in 1982, bankruptcy courts no longer
had jurisdiction over “non-core” claims in bankruptcy proceedings because
these courts lacked Article III protection.113 Any grant of broad jurisdictional
powers to non-Article III courts was considered an encroachment on judicial
authority.114 However, in 1986, the Supreme Court was presented with another
constitutional issue similar to that in Northern Pipeline, but this time involving
a different congressional act regarding the futures contracts market.115
Specifically, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibited fraudulent and
manipulative conduct in connection with commodity futures transactions.116 To
facilitate the regulatory powers of the CEA, Congress established an
independent federal agency in 1974, called the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC).117 The CFTC was intended to facilitate an “‘inexpensive
and expeditious alternative to existing fora available to aggrieved customers,
namely, the courts and arbitration.”118 To promote these goals, the CFTC issued
a regulation allowing its administrative law judges to adjudicate counterclaims
“arising out of the transaction . . . or series of transactions . . . set forth in the
complaint.”119
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court held that an
administrative agency’s ruling on a state law counterclaim was constitutional.120
Here, plaintiff Schor filed a claim with the CFTC against a brokerage firm for

after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those
matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.”).
112
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
113
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1983).
114
See generally N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50.
115
See Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
116
7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
117
See Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 836–37.
118
S. REP. NO. 95-850, at 11 (1978).
119
Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 837; See generally 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)
(1983).
120
Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833.
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violating the CEA.121 In response, the firm filed a state law counterclaim to
recover a debit balance in Schor’s account.122 In a CFTC proceeding, an
administrative law judge ruled in favor of the firm on both claims.123 Schor
subsequently challenged the CFTC’s jurisdiction to hear state law counterclaims
and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. The Court of Appeals, in an attempt to avoid the same constitutional
issue presented in Northern Pipeline, held that the CFTC only had jurisdiction
over Schor’s claim, but not the brokerage firm’s counterclaim. After another
appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.124
Writing for the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor applied a broad
construction of both the CEA and Article III.125 With regards to the CEA, the
Court held that the D.C. Circuit, in an attempt to avoid constitutional problems,
“manufactured[d] a restriction on the CFTC’s jurisdiction that was nowhere
contemplated by Congress and reject[ed] plain evidence of congressional intent
because that intent was not specifically embodied in a statutory mandate.”126
Justice O’Connor recognized that Congress created the CFTC with the purpose
of providing “an inexpensive and expeditious alternative to existing fora
available to aggrieved customers, namely, the courts and arbitration.”127 The
Court acknowledged that agencies have superior knowledge to courts when
deciding if a “particular regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate any of
the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes of [an] Act the [agencies
are] charged with enforcing” and are “therefore due substantial deference.”128
Next, the Court applied a broad construction of Article III to determine
whether the CFTC’s exercise of jurisdiction over state law counterclaims was
unconstitutional.129 Justice O’Connor weighed three factors, with careful
attention to the practical effects that such congressional action would have on
the integrity of the Judiciary.130
First, the Court considered the scope of judicial power reserved to Article III
courts, in relation to the extent that an administrative agency exercised judicial

121
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123
124
125
126
127
128
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130

Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 838–41.
See id. at 833.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 836 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 847.
Id. at 851.
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power.131 Justice O’Connor reasoned that, notwithstanding common law
counterclaims, the CFTC’s adjudicatory powers were in line with the
“traditional agency model.”132 Precedent indicated that, as a practical matter, it
was not unconstitutional for a federal agency to initially adjudicate a state law
claim when the claim was ancillary to federal law and subject to appellate
review.133 The Court emphasized that it was improper to declare such an exercise
of authority as unconstitutional based on a fear of a “hypothetical slippery
slope.”134
Second, the Court considered the nature of the pending claim.135 In Schor,
the counterclaim was a “private right” governed by state law.136 Although state
law claims were historically reserved for and resolved by Article III courts,
Justice O’Connor found that “there [was] no reason inherent in separation of
powers principles to accord the state law character of a claim talismanic power
in Article III inquiries.”137 Instead, a broad construction, “beyond form to the
substance of what Congress has done,” suggested that the CFTC’s limited
jurisdiction over a narrow class of ancillary common law claims was not a
genuine threat to the separation of powers.138
Third, the Court considered the motivations behind Congress’s departure
from Article III requirements.139 Justice O’Connor recognized that Congress,
when authorizing the CFTC to resolve counterclaims, did not intend to allocate
or dilute jurisdiction among federal tribunals.140 Rather, the purpose was to
provide a specific and limited federal regulatory scheme as an “inexpensive and
expeditious” alternative.141 The Court determined that the reparations scheme in
itself was certainly constitutional, and the ability to hear counterclaims was
necessary to efficiently facilitate the process.142 In promotion of the ultimate
goal, this allocation of authority to the CFTC was deemed to be, at worst, a de
minimis intrusion.143
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Id. at 851–52.
Id.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 851–52.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 854.
Id. at 851.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
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By considering these three factors, the Court applied a broad construction of
Article III, with heavy emphasis on the unique aspects of each congressional
plan, and the practical effects in light of Article III safeguards.144 This time, the
broad construction analysis in the Northern Pipeline dissent became the
framework of the Schor majority opinion: “Bright line rules cannot effectively
be employed to yield broad principles in all Article III inquires.” Nonetheless,
this broad construction analysis would not last.
3. Stern v. Marshall: Although Statutorily Authorized, a Bankruptcy Court
Lacks the Constitutional Authority to Enter Final Judgment on
Unresolved State Law Counterclaims in a Bankruptcy Proceeding
Although strict construction of Article III in Northern Pipeline initially
tightened the scope of bankruptcy court authority, subsequent use of broad
construction shaped later Supreme Court holdings.145 The holdings in Schor and
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Company seemed to indicate a
trend towards greater consideration of pragmatic efficiency and legislative
intent.146
In 2011, however, a 5-4 decision in Stern v. Marshall significantly limited
bankruptcy court authority.147 Here, the Supreme Court held that although the
bankruptcy court had statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to enter
final judgment on core counterclaims unresolved in the process of ruling on a
creditor’s proof of claim, the court ultimately lacked the constitutional authority
to do so under Article III of the Constitution.148
In Stern, celebrity Anna Nicole Smith (Smith), or legally Vickie Lynn
Marshall, married J. Howard Marshall, an 89-year-old oil tycoon who died
shortly after marriage.149 Before J. Howard Marshall’s death, his son, Pierce
Marshall (Marshall), allegedly excluded Smith from her husband’s estate
through fraud, so she sued Marshall in Texas probate court for tortious

144

Id. at 857.
Compare N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), with Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 563 (1985), and Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833.
146
See generally Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 563; Commodity Futures Trading
Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833.
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Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
148
Id. at 503.
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Id. at 462.
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interference.150 In response, Marshall filed a counterclaim alleging
defamation.151 Before judgment in the Texas probate court, Smith filed for
bankruptcy in a California bankruptcy court, and Marshall followed by filing a
proof of claim for defamation damages to the bankruptcy court.152
Smith again filed for tortious interference, but this time as a counterclaim in
the bankruptcy case.153 The California bankruptcy court ultimately ruled in favor
of Smith and awarded her damages.154 Marshall then appealed to the federal
district court, claiming that because the tortious interference counterclaim was
“non-core” to the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction.155 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.156
Writing for the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts determined that
bankruptcy courts lacked the jurisdiction to enter final judgment on state law
counterclaims that were non-core to the bankruptcy proceeding.157 The Court
reasoned that because they were not Article III courts, bankruptcy courts could
not exercise “the judicial power of the United States” absent “limited
circumstances.”158 Such “limited circumstances” consisted only of the three
categories of exceptions laid out in Northern Pipeline: territorial courts, courtsmarital, and public-rights disputes.159 Chief Justice Roberts further indicated that
while the bankruptcy courts’ exercise of judicial authority may prove efficient,
practical effects alone were insufficient to overcome unconstitutionality and the
strict separation of powers.160 The majority was not persuaded by any assertions
that bankruptcy courts were mere adjuncts of the district courts.161
Although broad construction advocates stressed the importance of “a single
tribunal [having] broad authority to restructure [debtor-creditor] relations,” the
150
Kenneth N. Klee, Klee on Stern v. Marshall, 2011 LEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 5743, at 1–2
(June 2011).
151
Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub. nom. Stern, 131
S. Ct. 2594.
152
Id. at 1043–44.
153
Id. at 1043–45.
154
Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), adopted as modified,
275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern, 131
S. Ct. 2594.
155
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 499.
159
Id. at 500.
160
Id. at 506.
161
Id. at 488–89.
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Stern majority remained unconvinced.162 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts
minimized the importance of counterclaims being resolved in bankruptcy courts,
maintaining that “the practical consequences of such limitations on the authority
of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are [not] as significant . . . as the
dissent suggest[s].”163 He indicated that the Code “already contemplates that
certain state law matters in bankruptcy cases will be resolved by judges other
than those of bankruptcy courts.”164 Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2),
bankruptcy courts were required to abstain from hearing non-core, state law
claims capable of timely adjudication in a state forum with jurisdiction.165
Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts did not believe that the “removal of
counterclaims . . . from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully change[d] the
division of labor in the current statute.”166 He reasoned that as long as district
courts rendered the final decisions, there would be no harmful consequences
because bankruptcy judges could still hear counterclaims to propose findings of
fact and conclusions of law.167 The Court also qualified the question presented
and answered in Stern as a “narrow” one, believing that this strict construction
of Article III would not prove detrimental to the bankruptcy process.168
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer asserted that too much weight was
placed on certain Article III precedent but not enough on others.169 In particular,
he argued that the Court should have looked to more recent Article III precedent,
such as Schor and Thomas, rather than placing a disproportionate amount of
emphasis on an earlier Northern Pipeline decision.170 The dissent indicated that
in both Schor and Thomas, there was a clear shift from “formalistic and
unbending rules” to a more pragmatic and multifactor analysis.171 This analysis
centered on whether “a challenged delegation of adjudicatory authority posed a
genuine and serious threat that one branch of Government sought to aggrandize

162

Id. at 502.
Id. at 501.
164
Id. at 502.
165
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2012) (“Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a
case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an
action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”).
166
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 467.
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Id. at 501–02.
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Id. at, 503.
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Id. at 506–07 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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Id. at 513.
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its own constitutionally delegated authority by encroaching upon a field of
authority that the Constitution assigns exclusively to another branch.”172
Accordingly, Justice Breyer gave greater deference to the broad Article III
construction exhibited in the more recent Schor and Thomas decisions. In Schor,
the Court determined that “the purposes underlying the requirements of Article
III” were more important than “conclusory reference to the language.”173 The
Schor holding demonstrated an unwillingness to simply “adopt formalistic and
unbending rules.” 174 Further, in Thomas, the Court stated that “practical
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories . . .
inform[ed] application of Article III.”175 The Thomas holding demonstrated a
reliance on “the nature of the right at issue and the concerns motivating the
Legislature” when addressing the constitutional issues.176 In light of these
holdings, the Stern dissent “conclude[d] that the delegation of adjudicatory
authority [in Stern was] constitutional.”177
Specifically, Justice Breyer gave five reasons why a “grant of authority to a
bankruptcy court to adjudicate compulsory counterclaims [did] not violate any
constitutional separation-of-powers principle related to Article III.”178 First,
Smith’s tortious interference counterclaim “resemble[d] various common-law
actions” often heard in bankruptcy courts.179 Because bankruptcy courts already
heard claims of a similar nature to state law tort claims, there was only a nominal
difference in hearing a tortious interference counterclaim.180
Second, the exercise of judicial authority by bankruptcy courts favored
constitutionality because these courts were “made up of judges who enjoy
considerable protection from improper political influence.”181 These protections
included: (1) federal court appointment of bankruptcy judges;182 (2) removal of
bankruptcy judges by a circuit judicial council;183 (3) bankruptcy court salaries
pegged to those of federal district court judges;184 and (4) courthouse costs and
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Id. at 510.
Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 847.
Id. at 850.
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S., 563, 587 (1985).
Id. at 590.
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 513 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514–15.
28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 152(e).
Id. § 152(a).
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other work-related expenses paid by the Judiciary.185 Essentially, these
safeguards made bankruptcy judges similar to “magistrate judges, law clerks,
and [the] Judiciary’s administrative officials who lack Article III tenure and
compensation protections but do not endanger the independence of the Judicial
Branch.”186
Third, because “Article III judges control and supervise the bankruptcy
court’s determinations,” bankruptcy court authority to hear the counterclaim did
not really endanger judicial independence.187 After a ruling from a bankruptcy
court, any party to the case had the option to “appeal those determinations to the
federal district court, where the federal judge will review all determinations of
fact for clear error and will review all determinations of law de novo.”188
Additionally, Article III judges essentially “maintain[ed] greater control of
bankruptcy court proceedings at issue here than they did over the relevant
proceedings in any of the previous cases in which this Court has upheld a
delegation of adjudicatory power.”189
Fourth, the court’s judgment favored constitutionality because the parties
consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.190 Justice Breyer explained that
“even when private rights are at issue, non-Article III adjudication may be
appropriate when both parties consent.”191
Fifth, the legislative purpose served by granting judicial authority to
bankruptcy courts strongly favored constitutionality.192 The purpose of
establishing federal bankruptcy courts was “to create a single tribunal that could
efficiently restructure debtor-creditor relations.”193 As such, effective
bankruptcy proceedings required an investment of broad authority to “decid[e]
all matters in dispute . . . and decree[] complete relief.”194 Considering all five
of these reasons, the Stern dissent concluded that “the magnitude of any
intrusion on the Judicial Branch [could] only be termed de minimis,” and argued
the statute was constitutional.195
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Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 514–15 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013.
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 514–15 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 n.31 (1982).
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.; see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 335 (1966).
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 517–19 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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Despite these five objections, the decision in Stern significantly narrowed
the scope of bankruptcy court authority.196 Stern halted the trend towards broad
construction of Article III judicial authority and reinstituted a strict construction
emphasizing formal boundaries over pragmatic consequences. However, it was
not long before this formalistic approach to Article III once again took a backseat
to procedural efficiency and bankruptcy goals.197
4. Wellness International Network, Limited v. Sharif: Article III Authorizes
Bankruptcy Courts to Adjudicate Noncore Claims in a Bankruptcy
Proceeding with the Parties’ Voluntary and Knowing Consent
The decision in Wellness International Network, Limited v. Sharif is another
example of how strict and broad construction of Article III continually molds
the scope of bankruptcy court authority. Although unable to directly address the
Article III constitutional question, the Wellness majority applied a broad
construction to sidestep the strict construction holding in Stern and to provide
broader procedural relief through consent.
In May 2015, less than four years after the Stern decision, broad construction
of Article III again circumvented strict limitations to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction.198 In Wellness, the Supreme Court addressed clarity and efficiency
in bankruptcy procedure by broadening the scope of bankruptcy court authority.
The Court held that, with the intentional and voluntary consent of both parties
in a bankruptcy proceeding, bankruptcy courts could constitutionally exercise
Article III authority to enter final judgments on non-core claims.199
Here, respondent Richard Sharif filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed
petitioner Wellness International Network (“Wellness”) as a creditor. However,
Wellness filed an adversary proceeding against Sharif, alleging that Sharif
fraudulently transferred over five million dollars in assets to a trust administered
on his mother’s behalf.200 Because Sharif failed to provide discovery in the
proceedings, the bankruptcy court entered default judgment in favor of Wellness
and designated the trust funds as part of Sharif’s property of the estate.201 Sharif
subsequently appealed to the district court, claiming that the bankruptcy court
was limited to proposing findings of facts and recommendations of law to the

196
197
198
199
200
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See generally id. at 517–19.
See generally Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1940.
Id. at 1941.

KIM_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

582

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

6/14/2018 3:43 PM

[Vol. 34

district court.202 Although the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
order, the case ultimately made it onto the Supreme Court’s docket.203
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor began by reinforcing the
conclusion that Article III served as a structural protection against congressional
attempts to transfer judicial authority to non-Article III courts “for the purpose
of emasculating constitutional courts.”204 She also reiterated that Article III
functioned to “[prevent] the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at
the expense of the other.”205 Even so, the Court affirmatively concluded that
“allowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims submitted to them by consent
[did] not offend the separation of powers so long as Article III courts [retained]
supervisory authority over the process.”206 The question now became whether
allowing bankruptcy courts to decide non-core claims by consent would
“impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”207
As emphasized previously by advocates of broad construction, the Court
determined that this question “must be decided not by formalistic and unbending
rules but an eye to the practical effect that the practice will have on the
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.”208 Consequently, Justice
Sotomayor applied a familiar framework of analysis, previously used in Schor
and recently advocated in the Stern dissent, to conclude that “allowing
bankruptcy litigants to waive the right to Article III adjudication of [non-core]
claims does not usurp the constitutional prerogatives of Article III courts.”209
Specifically, she considered that: (1) bankruptcy courts already often heard
many related state law claims; (2) non-article III judges had sufficient safeguards
from outside influence; (3) federal district courts had appellate review and
supervisory roles in every bankruptcy proceeding; (4) party consent to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction favored constitutionality; and (5) the nature of
bankruptcy courts and legislative purpose for its authority also favored
constitutionality.210
Following a more pragmatic approach, the Court entertained an alternative
where “Congress could choose to rest the full share of the Judiciary’s labor on
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
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the shoulders of Article III judges,” but concluded that “doing so would require
a substantial increase in the number of district judgeships.”211 Justice Sotomayor
reasoned that “Congress [therefore] supplemented the capacity of district courts
through the able assistance of bankruptcy judges.”212 Again, she reinforced that
“[adjudication of non-core claims] poses no threat to the separation of powers”
as long as bankruptcy judges were subject to Article III courts.213
The Court also distinguished Wellness from the recent Stern case, and the
even earlier Northern Pipeline case, because those holdings were premised on
“the fact that the litigant did not truly consent to resolution of the claim against
it in a non-Article III forum.”214 Justice Sotomayor explained that “interpreting
Stern to bar consensual adjudications by bankruptcy courts would meaningfully
change the division of labor in [the] judicial system.”215 Moreover, “adjudication
based on litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the federal court system
since its inception,” and therefore “[posed] no great threat to anyone’s
birthrights, constitutional or otherwise.”216
Finally, the Wellness majority relied on an implied consent standard and
adopted it to the bankruptcy context.217 When applied to bankruptcy, this
implied consent standard “possess[ed] the same pragmatic virtues—increasing
judicial efficiency and checking gamesmanship—that [originally] motivated
[the Court’s] adoption of [this standard] for consent-based adjudications by
magistrate judges.”218
In opposition, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent applied a strict construction of
Article III, asserting that “with narrow exceptions, Congress may not confer
power to decide federal cases and controversies upon judges who do not comply
with the structural safeguards of Article III.”219 The dissent, which closely
mirrored the Stern majority’s rationale, opposed the Wellness majority’s
opportunistic use of a sufficiently narrow case to address a much broader Article
III constitutional question.220 In particular, while the immediate impact of the
Wellness decision may have been limited, there was concern that such an
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authorization of encroachment onto the Judiciary would yield future “erosion of
constitutional powers.”221
Further, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that preserving the separation of
powers was one of the Court’s heaviest responsibilities, and in performing this
duty, the Court has not hesitated to enforce the Constitution’s mandate “that one
branch of Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of
another.”222 He was also concerned about upholding the Framer’s intentions
when forming the Constitution.223 The dissent relied on James Madison’s
statement that “if there is a principle in our Constitution . . . more sacred than
another, it is that which separates the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
powers.”224
In addition, the Wellness dissent contended that bankruptcy court judges
lacked the specific Article III protections of life tenure and secured salary that
were required to render final judgments.225 Thus, exercising such judicial
authority compromised Article III safeguards and was beyond constitutional
scope.226 According to the dissent, Sharif did not have the authority to
compromise the structural separation of powers, or agree to an exercise of
judicial power outside Article III because separation of powers principles did
not depend on whether the “encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment.”227 In particular, “the fact that Article III judges played a role in
the Article III violation does not remedy the constitutional harm.”228
As apparent in Wellness, while the societal need for bankruptcy law remains
largely unchanged, the ever-changing composition of the Supreme Court
continues to alter the Court’s propensity for strict or broad construction, which,
in turn, continues to alter the scope of bankruptcy court authority.
II. ANALYSIS
Having examined the inconsistent history of bankruptcy precedent and the
concerns of opposing constructions of Article III, this Comment suggests a
balanced approach which accounts for several significant interests. When
221
222
223
224
225
226
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228
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inevitably redrawing the constitutional lines of bankruptcy court authority, the
Court should extend sufficient consideration to the following four factors: (1)
the current threat of encroachment, and the amount of protection necessary to
prevent it; (2) the practical effects on bankruptcy proceedings, and the benefits
of preserving bankruptcy law; (3) the residual consequences to existing nonArticle III tribunals; and (4) the current trend and disposition of bankruptcy
authority. Lending appropriate weight to each factor will allow bankruptcy
procedures to adapt to rapid societal growth within a constitutional framework,
while increasing the predictability of bankruptcy law development.
A. Factor One: The Current Potential for Encroachment Against the Current
Preventive Safeguards
When addressing violations of Article III judicial independence, the Court
should determine whether the current structural protections are sufficient to
address the dangers of encroachment. If existing safeguards adequately protect
against potential infringements, then concerns regarding constitutional
violations would be mitigated and more focus should be paid to the remaining
factors. If, however, impending violations outweigh current protections, then
structural interests should be the highest priority. To make this determination,
the Court should first measure the immediate potential for encroachment, then
independently assess what specific safeguards would be necessary to prevent
such violations. Only then can the Court properly determine whether current
safeguards sufficiently protect against infringements.
1. Measuring the Immediate Potential for Encroachment
To measure the immediate potential for encroachment, the Court should first
look to the relevant provisions of Article III.229 In part, Section 1 states, “The
judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”230 Based on the language, there is no dispute in interpretation that
judicial power is vested in Article III courts.231 However, the text of Section 1
only articulates that judicial power is always vested in Article III courts—the
text does not explicitly specify an unconditional limitation that judicial power
must be exercised solely by Article III courts.232 This discrepancy is significant

229
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because the face of the text allows for a different, conceivable interpretation:
non-Article III tribunals may constitutionally exercise judicial authority in
certain situations, provided that Article III courts always retain permanent and
predominant judicial authority.233
In fact, this interpretation directly correlates with one of the factors
considered in the Wellness majority’s balancing test: the nature of the nonArticle III court.234 In Wellness, the specific nature of a non-Article III court
carried substantial weight in determining the potential threat of encroachment
onto judicial authority.235 In particular, the magnitude of probable danger was
contingent on whether a non-Article III court siphoned judicial power at the
expense of Article III courts.236 This deeper analysis into a non-Article III court’s
exercise of judicial power inherently suggests that non-Article III exercise is not
categorically unconstitutional, but that potential encroachment is instead
measured on a spectrum governed by certain characteristics.
One significant characteristic in determining the threat of non-Article III
exercise of judicial authority can be inferred from the Wellness decision: an
intent to subvert the Judiciary. It seems clear that non-Article III exercise of
judicial authority is unconstitutional when the purpose is to bypass federal courts
(e.g., a congressional act authorizing the exercise of judicial power with the
intent to circumvent federal court jurisdiction). However, making such a
determination is not as simple or clear when non-article III tribunals exercising
limited judicial power were created for the primary purpose of assisting Article
III courts. Again, the Court’s need for a deeper analysis into the unique
circumstances of each case is evidence that the constitutionality of non-Article
III exercise of judicial power is not always clear-cut.
Following suit, there may be additional characteristics that substantially
move the needle when determining the dangers of non-Article III judicial
authority. Such characteristics may include the absence of Article III
supervision, the absence of benefit to the non-Article III tribunal, and the breadth
of judicial authority conferred. For example, if non-Article III courts functioned
with the noblest of intentions, but exercised judicial power without the
possibility of appellate review by district courts, it would still indicate a clear
threat. If non-Article III tribunals exercised Article III authority to the benefit of
no one other than the tribunal or Congress itself, it would also signal danger. If
233
234
235
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Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1946.
See id.
See id.
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a non-Article III court maintained broader Article III jurisdiction than the federal
judicial courts themselves, it would constitute encroachment. However, if a nonArticle III court was subject to Article III appellate review, exercised judicial
authority for the sole purpose of assisting Article III courts, and maintained very
limited judicial authority, then this would suggest that there is no genuine,
present threat to the Judicial Branch.
Further, when defining the dangers to Article III structural safeguards, it is
particularly important to study the Framers’ intentions. There is little doubt that
the separation of powers must be handled with ample care; however, a far too
narrow interpretation of the Framers’ intentions can stifle the process of
determining the actual dangers.237 Aggrandizing the current dangers with
theoretical risks undermines any practical solutions with an endless array of
abstract hypotheticals. In fact, an interpretation that is too narrow can turn
checks and balances into an impediment that deteriorates cooperation among
each government branch and instead fosters complete isolation from one
another.238 Supreme Court precedent indicates that a governmental framework
of isolation is contrary to the Framers’ vision of the separation of powers.239
Among other precedent, the Court established in Buckley v. Valeo that the
Framers recognized a “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government
from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively.”240 Moreover, the Court, in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Company v. Sawyer, believed the Framers understood that “while the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.”241 Such precedent indicates that the Framers envisioned a system
of checks and balances designed to both protect liberties and facilitate
interdependence within each designated area.242 A far too narrow interpretation
of the Framers’ intent, in contrast, can lead to a disproportionate fear of
hypothetical dangers, to a point where necessary cautions become debilitating
impediments to both the government and society.243
237

See, e.g., id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
See generally id. at 1950.
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See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952).
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 121.
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 636.
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See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 121; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
at 636.
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Finally, it is important to define an “encroachment” or “intrusion” when
measuring the dangers to Article III jurisdiction. The Wellness dissent
emphasized that the Court has not hesitated to enforce the Constitution’s
mandate “that one branch of Government may not intrude upon the central
prerogatives of another.”244 The key word here is “intrude.”245 The basic
definition of “intrude” is “to thrust or bring in without invitation, permission, or
welcome.”246 In the bankruptcy court context, it is misleading to say that
Congress thrust itself into judicial authority without invitation, permission, or
welcome. In fact, it was the district courts that initially referred bankruptcy cases
to bankruptcy courts.247 Actual intrusion upon the central prerogatives of another
branch would more properly be illustrated by a scenario in which Congress
provided unsolicited assistance to the Judiciary through unhelpful non-article III
tribunals, in spite of the Judiciary’s resistance. As such, necessary assistance
should not be categorically equated with unsolicited intrusion, and this
distinction alone may mitigate concerns regarding specific instances of
“intrusion.”
Similarly, the term “encroachment” has been used several times in Supreme
Court precedent regarding bankruptcy authority.248 For example, the Wellness
dissent asserted that the approval of the “encroached-upon” does not alleviate
unconstitutional “encroachment.”249 However, what would the Framers consider
an “encroachment?” The Court has previously documented “the genius of the
Framers’ pragmatic vision . . . long recognized in cases that find constitutional
room for necessary institutional innovation.”250 Referring to the Framers’
original separation of powers as a “pragmatic vision” suggests that practical
effects were indeed important considerations to the Framers.251
If pragmatic concerns were particularly significant, it seems probable that
the Framers would not have considered a limited exercise of Article III authority
by bankruptcy courts as an encroachment. If so, perhaps this Article III conflict
is not truly about the potential dangers of encroachment or intrusion, but
something else altogether.

244
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Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Intrude, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/intrude. (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 38.
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1934.
Id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 472 (1998).
See generally id.
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2. Determining the Necessary Safeguards to Prevent Encroachment
To determine the safeguards necessary to preserve the function of Article
III, it is important to look at the relevant provisions. In part, Article III Section
1 states, “The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their
services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.”252 A strict construction of this provision suggests that the
only adequate safeguards are life tenure and protection from salary reduction.253
However, a strict interpretation of Article III safeguards may not always result
in the greatest protection. Moreover, there is a sufficient amount of broad
construction precedent which supports different forms of protections that
sufficiently preserve Article III objectives.
Among others, the Stern majority and the Wellness dissent serve as
examples. These two cases placed significant value in the protection provided to
Article III judges: freedom from outside influence.254 Life tenure and fixed
salary, however, are not necessarily the sole safeguards that provide such
freedom. In fact, diminishing the power and competence of Article I bankruptcy
judges because they lack certain safeguards can actually prove to be
counterproductive. Limiting bankruptcy court authority does not automatically
guarantee that the parties to the bankruptcy proceedings will find themselves
under the authority of judges with life tenure and secured salary. Rather, a loss
of faith in the efficacy, and an increase in uncertainty about the finality, of
bankruptcy courts may even encourage people to avoid bankruptcy courts
altogether and decide cases in state court, where judges also lack these same
Article III safeguards.
When following a strict construction of Article III protection, the plain
reading logically suggests that state court judges lack even more safeguards from
outside influence than bankruptcy court judges.255 This is because state court
judges are often elected judicial candidates who serve limited terms.256 In the
State of Georgia, superior and state court judges must be elected and re-elected
on a nonpartisan basis for four-year terms.257 Due to the nature of such elections,
it has become necessary for such judicial contenders to solicit not only campaign
252

U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
Id.
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Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 505 (2011).
255
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
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basis for a term of four years.”).
257
Id.
253

KIM_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

590

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

6/14/2018 3:43 PM

[Vol. 34

contributions, but also public statements of support.258 In fact, candidates are
encouraged to form committees to manage funds and obtain support.259
It is contentious, to say the least, that elected state court judges, who at times
must preside over the very electorate from whom they sought contribution or
support, are incapable of rendering unbiased final adjudications with absolute
integrity simply because they lacked a specific form of “freedom from outside
influence.” State court judges are certainly capable of honorably and impartially
entering final judgments, even though state courts do not have the specific
safeguards required of federal courts under Article III.
Consequently, the conclusion that bankruptcy court judges are not qualified
to render final judgments, solely based on their lack of the specific safeguards
listed in Article III, seems to be more of a theoretical, rather than realistic,
assessment of the situation. Moreover, precedent indicates that there are
fundamental conflicts between theoretical reasoning and practical reality. As
indicated by the Stern dissent and Wellness majority, bankruptcy judges actually
have numerous safeguards in place against “improper political influence.”260
Among others, federal bankruptcy judges are appointed by the federal court of
appeals;261 bankruptcy judges can be removed for cause by a circuit judicial
council consisting of federal court of appeals and federal district court judges;262
bankruptcy judges have salaries pegged to the salaries of federal district court
judges;263 bankruptcy judges have courthouses and work-related expenses paid
by the Judiciary itself.264 A formalistic interpretation of Article III overlooks all
of the protections currently in place that insulate bankruptcy courts from external
influence.
Relying solely on a strict construction of Article III to narrowly identify two
exclusive forms of protection favors categorization over function. By this
reasoning, a hypothetical federal tribunal with even greater protections than
those listed in Article III would not pass constitutional muster if its judges did
not have both life tenure and secured salaries. An interpretation prioritizing form

258
Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Georgia, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_conduct.cfm?state=GA
(last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
259
Id.
260
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 514 (2011) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
261
28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012).
262
Id. § 152(e).
263
Id. § 153(a).
264
Id. § 156(e).
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over substance, particularly in the bankruptcy court context, does not guarantee
safer results.
3. Weighing Current Dangers against Current Safeguards
After making the determinations in steps 1 and 2 above, the Court should
weigh the potential dangers against the current protections. Presently, there seem
to be sufficient safeguards surrounding bankruptcy court authority to overcome
potential dangers.265 Bankruptcy courts seem to pose minimal threat because
they are subject to appellate review, exercise limited Article III authority, and
do so to efficiently provide relief, not to “emasculat[e] constitutional courts.”266
Further, the current safeguards seem to sufficiently ensure freedom from outside
influence because the federal judiciary maintains complete supervisory authority
of bankruptcy procedures.267 The only true threat seems to be based on a
“potential” derived from a formalistic reading of Article III. Consequently, the
current balance seems to weigh in favor of constitutionality.
B. Factor Two: Practical Effects on Bankruptcy Proceedings and the Benefits
of Preserving Bankruptcy Law
In today’s society, the changing scope of bankruptcy court authority can
result in many practical consequences.268 A strict construction of Article III,
however, adheres to formalistic textual interpretation with minimal
consideration of practical effects. As evident in Stern, the Court was “not
convinced that the practical consequences of such limitations on the authority of
bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments are as significant as . . . the dissent
suggests.”269 In the midst of conflicting views, the Court should make an
objective assessment of the costs of limiting bankruptcy court authority by
identifying the practical effects of bankruptcy proceedings and the benefits of
preserving bankruptcy law.
When determining the practical effects of bankruptcy proceedings, a natural
starting point is to look at the court docket. The dissent in Stern drew attention
to the sizable difference between the bankruptcy and federal dockets.270 It
recognized a large discrepancy between the “staggering [volume]” of

265
266
267
268
269
270

See generally Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932.
Id. at 1944–45.
See generally id. at 1932.
Id. at 517–19 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 501.
Id. at 520.
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bankruptcy cases of “almost 1.6 million” compared to the volume of federal
district cases of “around 280,000 civil cases and 78,000 criminal cases.”271 It is
important to remember that the bankruptcy court’s authority to decide all matters
in bankruptcy proceedings is fundamental to procedural efficiency because state
law claims and counterclaims frequently arise in bankruptcy.272 In reality, many
compulsory counterclaims in bankruptcy cases “involve the same factual
disputes as the claims that may be finally adjudicated by the bankruptcy
courts.”273 If a bankruptcy court must regularly submit recommendations and
wait for district court rulings before entering its own final judgments, it
undoubtedly leads to “inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless
additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”274
An empirical analysis of recent bankruptcy filings may prove helpful in
ascertaining practical effects. According to statistical data, in 2015, there were
349 authorized bankruptcy judgeships with only 330 active judges presiding
over bankruptcy cases.275 However, there were 860,182 bankruptcy filings in
2015, and 805,580 bankruptcy filings in 2016.276 This means there was an
average annual caseload of about 2,441 to 2,600 cases per active bankruptcy
judge.277 While some bankruptcy cases are likely to produce minimal
adjudicatory work, there are other cases that contain over hundreds of adversary
proceedings and contested issues.278
In comparison, there were 1,015 active and senior district court judges279
handling 387,687 filings in 2015.280 This means the average caseload for each
district judge consists of about 381 cases.281 If bankruptcy cases were
additionally distributed to each district judge in 2015, the caseload of each judge
271
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See, e.g., In re CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d 432 (CA2 2008); In re Winstar Communications, Inc., 348
B.R. 234 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
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Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. at 520 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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Id.
275
Total Judicial Officers – U.S. Court of Appeals, District Courts, and Bankruptcy Courts, UNITED
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table1.01.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2016).
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Caseload Statistics Data Tables, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/bf_f_0930.2016.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
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Susan DeSantis, Southern District Judges Preside Over Record High Bankruptcy Cases, N.Y.L.J.,
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202800542226/.
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Total Judicial Officers, supra note 275.
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United States District Courts – National Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2016.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
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would have increased from 381 cases to approximately 1229 cases—more than
triple the caseload.282 Although this is an extrapolated statistical example of
harmful practical consequences, it nevertheless shows that procedural concerns
are significant factors when determining the effects on the efficiency of both
bankruptcy and district court proceedings. Because bankruptcy precedent has
consistently proven that bankruptcy law is subject to change, it is particularly
important to focus on practical consequences when attempting to adjust to the
large number of annual bankruptcy filings and pending cases.283
Even without a tripled docket, increased delay will naturally follow a
limiting of bankruptcy court authority. Bankruptcy courts were established for
the very purpose of efficiently handling cases from the moment they are filed.284
As such, a system and rules of procedure are in place to help facilitate the
process. For example, a chapter 7 proceeding in a bankruptcy court will typically
take about four to six months from the date the debtor files the petition to the
granting of a discharge or going to trial.285 However, in 2015, it took a median
of 27 months for civil cases in a district court to go to trial.286
If a chapter 7 case involving non-core issues was presented to a bankruptcy
court, it is not a stretch to deduce that it may take more than four times longer
for debtors and creditors to receive final judgment because they must wait for
pending resolution of ancillary issues. Civil trial scheduling may also be
postponed in district courts where criminal cases are assigned higher priority
than civil cases.287 In a bankruptcy court with no authority to adjudicate disputed
state law claims, debtors will be stuck waiting for a separate federal district court
proceeding before the resolution of their bankruptcy petition.
As the Stern dissent warned, “to be effective, a [bankruptcy court] must have
broad authority to restructure [debtor-creditor] relations.”288 Typical bankruptcy
cases involve far more than a single debtor and single creditor. When there are
a large number of creditors, delays become further exacerbated if a bankruptcy
court cannot allocate resources before determining the legitimacy of each
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claim.289 In a case involving a debtor and potentially thousands of creditors,
everyone else gets less if one gets too much.
While the current reality of bankruptcy proceedings may not warrant
substantial reform, it seems undeniable that narrowing bankruptcy court
authority will have significant practical consequences. In particular, when
dealing with a debtor in severe financial distress, it is unfair to marginalize a
debtor’s pragmatic concerns.
C. Factor Three: The Residual Consequences to Existing Non-Article III
Tribunals
To accurately assess the impact of strict Article III interpretation to nonArticle III tribunals, the Court should analyze how precedent has dealt with
similar non-Article III disputes. A pertinent example is the Court’s treatment of
federal administrative agencies. In Schor, the Court dealt with the question of
whether a congressional act authorized a specialized administrative agency to
adjudicate state law counterclaims.290
It is important to note that the Court’s reasoning behind the majority opinion
in Schor essentially became the reasoning for the dissent in Stern.291 A
comparative analysis of the Schor majority and the Stern dissent can help explain
how the Court produced different holdings in these two cases. First, in both
cases, the non-Article III tribunals were created by Congress.292 Here, the
apparent distinction is that the bankruptcy court is a non-Article III court, while
the CFTC is a non-Article III federal administrative agency. In Stern, a
bankruptcy judge exercised judicial authority to determine related state law
counterclaims.293 In Schor, an administrative law judge of the CFTC exercised
judicial authority to determine ancillary state law counterclaims.294
An initial, factual comparison of Stern and Schor highlights the similarities
of both non-Article III tribunals. In fact, one might reasonably assume both
tribunals would be subject to the same treatment. However, the holdings indicate
that it is constitutional for Congress to authorize a federal administrative agency
to exercise Article III judicial authority, but it is unconstitutional for Congress
289
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Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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to authorize the bankruptcy court to exercise the same. At first glance, the
conflicting results which favor Article III constitutionality for federal agencies
over Article I tribunals suggest that there must be some very fundamental
differences between federal agencies and bankruptcy courts. A deeper look may
prove enlightening.
First, both the CFTC and bankruptcy courts are non-Article III tribunals.295
For the CFTC, an administrative law judge is hired by the federal agency’s
Office of Personnel Management through a merit selection process.296
Administrative judges have career tenure and are subject to removal and salary
reduction by the CFTC.297 In contrast, for bankruptcy courts, a bankruptcy judge
is appointed by the federal court of appeals. 298 Bankruptcy judges serve for
fourteen-year terms, are subject to removal by a circuit judicial council of federal
court of appeals and district judges,299 and have salaries fixed to those of federal
district court judges.300
The results from these comparisons are somewhat confounding. It seems
reasonable to conclude that a bankruptcy judge appointed by the federal district
court has more Article III oversight than an administrative law judge appointed
by a federal agency. However, the Court determined it was constitutional for the
CFTC administrative law judge to exercise judicial authority, but held it was
unconstitutional for a bankruptcy judge to exercise the same authority.301 If
Article III oversight does not account for these different results, then perhaps the
distinction is rooted in the Congressional motivations behind the allocation of
authority. Again, a deeper analysis is necessary.
The CFTC was created to prevent fraudulent futures and options
transactions, and judicial authority was necessary to hear related state law
counterclaims for efficient regulation of the futures contract market.302 In
contrast, the bankruptcy courts were created to provide the insolvent debtor with
a fresh start and unpaid creditors with equal repayment.303 Judicial authority to
hear related state law counterclaims was necessary for the efficient facilitation
295
Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, with Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833.
296
5 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012).
297
5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (2012).
298
28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012).
299
Id. § 152(a).
300
Id. § 153(a).
301
Compare Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, with Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833.
302
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303
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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of such relief and repayment.304 Still, precedent reveals that the CFTC can
exercise Article III authority, but the bankruptcy court cannot.305 This
conclusion is disconcerting because it indicates that the efficient and costeffective regulation of a commodity in the futures contract market is more
important than the efficient and cost-effective facilitation of bankruptcy relief to
debtors and creditors. While both functions may benefit substantially from
efficient adjudication, it seems at least equally important to address a debtor in
overwhelming debt as a consumer in the commodity futures contract market.
In fact, this inconsistency raises additional questions. Did Congress
unconstitutionally authorized non-Article III federal administrative agencies
with judicial authority to hear related state law claims? Or rather, did Congress
constitutionally confer non-Article III bankruptcy courts with judicial authority
in 1978—despite how the Court has interpreted it? In the larger scheme, if
federal administrative agencies were unconstitutionally authorized to exercise
judicial power, are the three narrow exceptions—territorial courts, courtsmartial, and public rights disputes—just examples of more “hypothetical
slippery slope[s]”306 that will threaten Article III separation of powers in the
future? If constitutionality is truly determined through a strict interpretation of
Article III, then there should be no room for inconsistent allocations or
exceptions.
In an attempt to answer these questions, it is helpful to examine the
arguments regarding Congress’s authority to confer judicial authority on nonArticle III tribunals. In particular, the Wellness dissent, which stressed the grave
implications of allowing parties to consent to constitutional violations, seems
subject to two opposing interpretations.307 In one interpretation, the dissent
implies that Congress may authorize non-Article III judges to decide federal
cases as long as they are officially categorized as an accepted federal agency or
one of the three Northern Pipeline exceptions.308 In the other interpretation, the
dissent implies that Congress may never authorize non-Article III judges to enter
final judgment in federal cases. Either way, both interpretations yield
implications that are inconsistent with precedent or the currently accepted
practices of society.309 If the constitutional separation of powers requires a bright

304
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line boundary, then what accounts for the different treatment of federal agencies
and bankruptcy courts in exercising Article III authority?
One possible answer is that the distinction is not actually rooted in a
substantive threat to the separation of powers. Rather, it is a distinction born of
an earlier Court favoring broad construction of Article III and a later Court
favoring strict construction. This seems particularly evident when strict
interpretation concerns about Article III structural safeguards are mostly
dependent on classification and categorization, rather than function or intention.
If so, the constitutional inquiry of Article III authority is far too contingent on
technical wording and not dependent enough on function.
The other potential answer is that Congress never had authority to confer
Article III authority on any non-Article III judge. This would indicate, however,
that it is unconstitutional for any administrative agencies, including the CFTC,
to exercise judicial authority. In fact, even the three narrow exceptions could be
considered violations because, regardless of classification, Congress never had
the authority to confer judicial power on any non-Article III tribunal. The
Wellness dissent expressed that “the fact that Article III judges played a role in
the Article III violation does not remedy the constitutional harm.”310 Following
this logic, does this consequently mean that the Supreme Court also played a
role in Article III violations when it allowed any non-Article III tribunal to
exercise judicial authority? According to the Wellness dissent, the answer may
be yes, if the power to enter final judgment is reserved solely for the Judiciary,
regardless of tradition or practicality of use.311
The inconsistent treatment of Article III authority, especially when
comparing Schor and Stern, is problematic. The Court may one day have to
address these discrepancies, but it must then be prepared to account for the
residual implications of its decision. If the Court adheres to the strict
construction of Article III, then is the Court acknowledging that it plays a
continual role in Article III violations through allocating authority to
administrative agencies and excepted tribunals, or is the Court recognizing the
unconstitutionality of institutional practices that have lasted for decades?
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D. Factor Four: Current Trend and Future Outlook of Bankruptcy Law: The
Stern Amendments
Since the ruling of Stern, and in response to shifting precedent from Stern to
Wellness, the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed amendments to
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures on April 28, 2016.312 When
determining the future scope of bankruptcy court authority, the Court should
lend greater deference to the recent trend of bankruptcy law, rather than selecting
precedent that most resonates with their canon of constitutional construction. By
respecting the current movement of bankruptcy law over a predisposition to a
particular interpretation, there will be more clarity to the future outlook of
bankruptcy law, and consequently, more predictability and greater ability to
prepare for future adjustments. The Stern amendments are an illustration of one
of the most recent developments in bankruptcy law.
The Stern amendments addressed Rules 7008, 7012, 7016, 9027, and 9033
of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures, which finally went into effect on
December 1, 2016.313 These amendments, proposed in response to Stern,
focused on three key changes: “(1) to eliminate the distinction between “core”
and “non-core” proceedings in the Bankruptcy Rules; (2) to require parties to
explicitly state from the beginning whether they consented to entry of final
judgment by a bankruptcy judge in all adversary proceedings; and (3) to direct
the bankruptcy courts to determine the proper treatment of all proceedings.”314
When determining the trend of bankruptcy court authority, it is important to
understand the reasoning and purpose behind these amendments.
In 2011, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules had already
considered amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules in response to the Stern
ruling.315 One substantial post-Stern issue was that the terms ‘core’ and ‘noncore’ were full of ambiguity.316 To make matters worse, even if a proceeding
was designated as statutorily core, there was a possibility that the bankruptcy
judge was not constitutionally authorized to determine the case, rendering the
proceeding constitutionally non-core.317 Without a definitive answer from the
Court, this continued to be a problem. For example, the existing Rules 7008318
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and 7012319 required that parties to adversary bankruptcy proceedings state in
the complaint and pleading whether the proceeding was core or non-core.320 For
non-core proceedings, a determination had to be made whether the pleader
consented to entry of final judgment by a bankruptcy judge.321 Under Rule
7012(b), final judgements could not be entered “except with the consent of the
parties.”322
When the constitutional validity of consent was finally upheld in the Court’s
subsequent Wellness decision, the Committee “voted unanimously to proceed
with the Stern amendments as originally drafted and approved, rather than
propose a set of amendments that would take a different approach to expressing
party consent to the bankruptcy court adjudication.”323 These amendments
provided for express consent from all parties to a bankruptcy court proceeding
so that, absent consent, it would not be necessary for another court to determine
whether bankruptcy courts had the authority to hear and determine disputes.324
Further, the Committee decided to go beyond the minimum implied consent
standard in Wellness, even though it recognized a small possibility that “an
express consent approach could result in more non-core and Stern claims being
adjudicated in the district court.”325 The reasoning was because an “express
consent approach [had] the advantage . . . of clarity.”326 Express consent would
eliminate any uncertainty regarding party consent because a court could simply
look to the pleadings and clearly determine whether parties explicitly
consented.327 Today, these amendments reflect an adherence to the development
of procedural efficiency by adding clarity to bankruptcy procedure.
The Committee also determined that it became unnecessary to determine
whether a pleading was core or non-core because even a statutorily core issue
did not necessarily establish constitutional authority of non-article III
bankruptcy courts to adjudicate the issue. Thus, the Stern amendments to Rules
7008 and 7012 were designed to require parties in every proceeding to explicitly
state their consent or non-consent to a bankruptcy judge’s entry of final

319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id. 7012(b).
H.R. DOC. NO. 114-130, at 52 (2016).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judgment, without distinction of core versus non-core.328 Similar amendments
were proposed to Rule 9027(a) and (e) involving removal.329 Removal actions
were amended to no longer distinguish between core or non-core, and instead
require a clear statement that the parties either consent or do not consent to final
judgment by a bankruptcy judge.330 By removing the distinction between core
or non-core, there should be less uncertainty about whether bankruptcy
judgments are truly final and the assurance that, regardless of the issues, final
judgment can be entered with party consent.
Finally, the Committee “believe[d] it [was] important to provide needed
clarity to the bankruptcy community as soon as possible regarding how
bankruptcy courts can proceed on a consent basis to adjudicate Stern claims.”331
As such, important amendments were also proposed to Rule 7016 involving pretrial procedures.332 These changes were designed to provide the bankruptcy
court with three options on how to exercise its authority in proceedings: (1) to
hear and determine the dispute, (2) to hear the dispute and issue findings of fact
and conclusions of law for the district court, or (3) to take some other action,
allowing for variation based on different scenarios the court might encounter.333
The final amendment was to Rule 9033, which governs subsequent procedures
once a bankruptcy court issues proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law.334 Once strictly limited to non-core proceedings, this change expanded
jurisdiction to any proceeding in which the bankruptcy court has issued proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Stern Amendments are signs of a current trend shifting from a strict
construction of formalistic and textual interpretations, to a broad construction of
the pragmatic effects to bankruptcy law efficiency. These amendments alleviate
some pragmatic concerns because they allow bankruptcy courts to definitively
adjudicate non-core proceedings with the parties’ consent and provide
procedural guidelines on how best to handle proceedings when lacking consent.

328

Id.at 52.
Id. at 54.
330
The Committee Notes on Rules—2016 Amendment provide in part: “Subdivisions (a)(1) and (e)(3) are
amended to delete the requirement for a statement that the proceeding is core or non-core and to require in all
removed actions a statement that the party does or does not consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by
the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 46.
331
Id. at 56.
332
Id. at 52.
333
The Committee Notes on Rules—2016 Amendment provides in part: “This rule is amended to create a
new subdivision (b) that provides for the bankruptcy court to enter final orders and judgment, issue proposed
findings and conclusions, or take some other action in a proceeding.” Id. at 42.
334
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9033.
329
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However, while these amendments have mitigated several procedural
uncertainties in bankruptcy proceedings, history shows that the Court can
drastically alter the scope of bankruptcy court authority through strict or broad
construction at any time. The Court has yet to provide a sufficiently clear or
indisputable answer to the deeper constitutional question of Article III authority.
CONCLUSION
Presently, the current outlook for bankruptcy procedure seems to be trending
towards appropriating weight to the pragmatic need for bankruptcy courts to
wield judicial authority. However, this current trend is the result of a Wellness
Court that favored broad construction, as opposed to the previous Stern Court
which adhered to strict construction. Thus, it is likely that facilitation of
bankruptcy goals will continue to be contingent on whether the Court
implements a strict or broad construction to future cases and controversies. For
the sake of consistency and predictability, the Court should lend greater
deference to the current trend of bankruptcy law when determining bankruptcy
court authority. If not, it is only a matter of time before bankruptcy law will
again be unpredictably altered by the opposing constructions of Article III text,
and the outcome will be unclear.
This Comment is not an imposition, but an attempt to reconcile the
drastically shifting landscape of bankruptcy court authority. The lack of clarity
resulting from the unstable scope of bankruptcy court authority erodes the
fundamental purpose of bankruptcy to provide quick and efficient debtor relief
and creditor repayment. Instead, too much time and resources are spent
addressing ancillary jurisdictional issues which lead to increased cost, delay, and
inefficiency. A balanced methodology, which weighs both the positive and
negative realities of bankruptcy law and governmental framework, serves as a
suggestion to provide more consistency and predictability in bankruptcy law
development.
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A priority in the future development of bankruptcy law should be to take
incremental steps from the unstable to the stable. All those involved in
bankruptcy—courts, judges, litigants, and society—stand to benefit from a little
more stability.
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